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Arguing and believing are two central cognitive dimensions of both human beings and
artificial intelligent agents. The interrelation of these two notions (or groups of notions)
is at the root of classic debates in epistemology and argumentation theory. During this
talk, we will critically review recent literature on combining two well-known families
of formalisms that account respectively for argumentation and beliefs, these are, formal
argumentation and epistemic logic.
Formal argumentation [2] is nowadays a well-established research area within the
field of artificial intelligence that attracts the attention of scholars coming from different
disciplines and traditions. It has moreover a strong potential for dealing with different
theoretical a practical problems. Following [15], the history of formal argumentation can
be analysed as split into two main branches: the study of argument-based inference and
the study of argument-based dialogues. Regarding the former, that will be our main fo-
cus here, another broad distinction between abstract and structured approaches is usually
made. Abstract argumentation disregards the nature of arguments and conflicts between
them, treating both of them as primitive entities, and focusing on the so-called evaluative
tier of argument strength [4], that is, how to resolve conflicts between arguments so as
to sort out subsets of acceptable ones. The work of [8] is usually considered as a land-
mark in this sub-field. The main proposal there was to model arguments as nodes of a
directed graph, and conflicts as edges between them. Although very simple, this model,
called abstract argumentation frameworks, has been shown to be a strongly intuitive, and
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powerful tool for many purposes. Structured argumentation, on the contrary, explicitly
accounts for the nature and structure of both arguments and conflicts, capturing the so-
called support and dialectic tiers of argument strength [4], that focus respectively, on how
strong the premisses of an argument support its conclusion and on how arguments attack
and defeat each other. To this respect, [14] could be mentioned as an influential, seminal
paper among structural approaches, from which the ASPIC family, and notably ASPIC+
[12], have received important attention.
Modern epistemic logic started with the works of [21] and [11]. Epistemic logic
studies the notions of knowledge and belief (as well as related epistemic attitudes) using
modal logic as the main mathematical tool. Since then, the field has evolved through the
exploration of different alternatives (as non-Kripkean semantics [13]), and the solution of
excessive idealizations of the model, e.g. the problem of logical omniscience. In its basic
setting, to which we limit ourself here for the sake of simplicity, multi-agent epistemic
models are just Kripke models (multi-directed graphs together with an atomic valuation),
containing one accessibility relation Ri for each agent. Agent i believes (knows) that p
is the case at a point w of the model if and only if at every Ri-successor of w, p holds as
well. Epistemic models are in turn described with a multi-modal language, that adds a
modality □i for each agent i to the language of propositional logic, informally interpreted
as “agent i believes (knows) that...”. Hence, epistemic logic can be seen as a formal model
for representing higher-order, qualitative epistemic attitudes, such as “I believe that you
don’t believe that I believe that p”.
What can formal argumentation do for epistemic logic? In a nutshell, formal argu-
mentation can provide epistemic logic with technical a conceptual insights for studying
the notion of argument-based belief. This connection is better understood if contextual-
ized within the relatively recent effort of the epistemic logic community to equip their
models of knowledge and belief with the heretofore excluded justification component.
This effort has crystallized in very heterogeneous proposals, such as justification logic
[1] or neighbourhood semantics for evidence logics [20]. During the talk, we will com-
pare semantic approaches to the notion of argument-based belief, as those developed in
[18, 19] and [22], to syntactic approaches, as the one of [5, 6] (a combination of ASPIC+
and epistemic logic), pointing out the advantages and shortcomings of each of them.
What can epistemic logic do for formal argumentation? In few words, epistemic
logic can be used as a powerful tool to deal with epistemic reasoning about abstract ar-
gumentation frameworks (and possibly other argumentation constructs). In this direction,
[17] is an important antecedent, where abstract argumentation frameworks were embed-
ded in multi-agent epistemic models under different assumptions. During the talk, we
will present recent results [16, 9, 10], that establish epistemic logic as a very general
framework for modelling qualitative uncertainty and multi-agency with respect to argu-
mentation structures, as well as their dynamics, making explicit by the way what are the
epistemic assumptions underlying other existing formalisms, such as incomplete argu-
mentation frameworks [3], and control argumentation frameworks [7].
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